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Abstract
A well-established result in the theoretical literature on labour market flexibility is that the employ-
ment should be more volatile in "flexible" labour markets. Over the last 35 years, Italy gives a good
example of a transition from an over-regulated labour market into a quite more flexible one. According
to the theory, the deregulation is expected to increase the employment variance. Despite the anecdotal
evidence reported in the press, the literature hardly finds any evidence for such an eﬀect. This paper
exploits time-series of several employment indicators since 1980, allowing us to compare decades with
diﬀerent labour market regulation. All the considered series show evidence of a structural break with
an increase in their variance after the deregulation, confirming the expected pattern. This gives some
support to the concerns for increased job insecurity.
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JEL Classification: C22, J23
1 Introduction
The theoretical literature on the consequences of labour market regulation finds that the main result of
job-protection is to smooth the path of the employment over the cycle. In fact, while the impact of job-
protection on the employment level is unclear,1 its eﬀect on the employment variance is well-known (Bentolila
and Bertola, 1990; Lazear, 1990).
In 1994 the OECD publications "Employment Outlook" and "The OECD Jobs Study" ranked Italy in
the first position according to the main indicators of labour market rigidity, namely employment protection
and labour market regulation. After the deregulation started in 1991-92, the updating of these indicators in
OECD (2004) indicates a substantially more flexible labour market. The Fraser Institute’s economic freedom
index for Italy confirms this pattern, being its value 3.7 in 1970, 4.1 in 1980, 4.2 in 1990 and 5.5 in 2004.2
The aim of this paper is to investigate the eﬀectiveness of the Italian labour market deregulation. This
is an important issue because the debate as to whether changes in employment regulation could imply job
instability is still controversial. Several authors find that the overall job stability has not decreased in the
recent years (see Winkelmann and Zimmermann, 1998; Erlinghagen, 2002; Auer, 2005; L’Horty, 2004, among
others). To analyse whether flexibility-oriented reforms have changed the behaviour of the Italian labour
market, we use some recent developments in time-series analysis. Our approach is based on the idea that
more freedom to hire and fire intensifies the responsiveness of the employment to macroeconomic fluctuations
by increasing its variance (Bertola, 1990; Abraham and Houseman, 1994). We search for evidence of this
eﬀect in several aggregate employment measures. Then, we check whether changes in the variance correspond
to the timing of labour market reforms.
∗We are grateful to Paolo Addesso, Sergio Destefanis, Riccardo Gatto, Vincenzo Pierro and Fabio Postiglione, who provided
us with the data and useful suggestions. All errors are our own.
†Department of Economics. University of Salamanca. Campus Miguel de Unamuno. E-37007. Salamanca. Spain. Tel.: +34
923 29 46 40 (ext. 31 26). Fax: +34 923 29 46 86. E-mail: rebeca.jimenez@usal.es
‡Correspondence to: Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche,Università di Salerno. I-84084. Fisciano. Italy. Tel.:
+39 089 96 27 09. Fax.: +39 089 96 31 51. E-mail:grusso@unisa.it.
1To aﬀect the employment level, other distortions -like wage rigidities- are needed (see, for example, Lazear 1990).
2The Fraser Institute: Economic Freedom of the World, Annual Report, 2006.
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This paper presents evidence of the eﬀectiveness of Italian labour market deregulation, with an increase
in the variance of employment indicators after the institutional reforms. This outcome is stronger when we
isolate the industrial sector. Furthermore, this paper also helps to explain why it is not easy to find any
change in the average job tenure or in job stability over the last decade given that institutional diﬀerences
only emerge when we go back to the 1980s.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the Italian labour market regulation. Section
3 describes the methodology. Section 4 reports our empirical findings, and Section 5 report draws some
concluding remarks.
2 Regulation and deregulation of the Italian labour market
A useful starting point to summarize the history of the Italian labour market regulation is 1962, when severe
limitations were introduced for temporary contracts. In 1966 a law prohibited ”unfair” dismissals. Since
1969 the main device to adjust the employment was a temporary lay-oﬀ (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni, CIG)
conceived to accommodate transitory fluctuations in production. In the 70s further controls were established:
the most pervasive regulation is law n.300/1970 (Statuto dei Lavoratori) which specified the hiring and firing
procedures, the working environment and the workers’ mobility inside the firms, the use of overtime, and
even wages with respect to the workers’ seniority. Moreover, it established the reinstatement obligation3 for
workers subject to unfair dismissals.
In 1974 the appeal procedure for unfair dismissal was made easier, and in 1975, after the oil shocks,
wages were indexed to inflation.
In 1984 we observe some attempts of deregulation: the wage indexation was reduced by 15%, and part-
time and training contracts (Contratti di Formazione e Lavoro, henceforth CFLs), were introduced. The
CFL, conceived as a form of paid apprenticeship, quickly became a way to reduce wages for new hirings.
In 1986 a referendum succeeded in further reducing the indexation. In the 1990s, a wave of innovations
restructured the labour market. In 1991 a law specified new procedures for collective firing, and it set new
limits to the use of the CIG. The following year the wage indexation was definitively abolished. In 1993,
the so-called Giugni agreement between unions, industrialists (Confindustria) and the government defined
a two-stage wage bargaining: a national-level bargaining to preserve the purchasing power, and a firm-level
bargaining to share productivity gains. Remarkably, the 1992-93 reforms were intended to increase wage
flexibility, which -as it is well-known- allows to circumvent job protection (Lazear, 1990). In 1994 the use of
the CFL was allowed for a much wider range of situations. Another key innovation was the introduction of
the ongoing collaboration contracts in 1995, since these contracts allow total freedom of hiring and firing.
In 1997 the introduction of temporary work agencies broke the monopoly of public employment agencies.
In 1998 law n. 196 (the so-called "Pacchetto Treu") introduced new "atypical" contracts, such as the
job-sharing and the staﬀ leasing. In 2001 leg. decree 368 made possible the use of fixed-term contracts
for subordinate workers as well; then, in 2003, the Biagi law has given the variety of "atypical" labour
contracts a common framework. This reform has specified and eased the regulation of the following subjects:
staﬀ-leasing, fixed-term contracts, intermittent work, job-sharing, work on project, and occasional work.
Currently, "flexible" work contracts are the overwhelming majority of new hirings (Contini and Trivellato,
2005, chapter IX and the references quoted therein).
3 Methodology
To study the eﬀectiveness of the Italian labour market deregulation, we analyse the properties of the real
GDP (used as a proxy of economic activity) and the main employment indicators. Our approach considers
not only changes in the variance, but also in the level and/or the trend. This is necessary because although
the final eﬀect of job-protection over the employment level is undetermined, this does not mean that there
is no eﬀect (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990).
The literature provides for several techniques for testing and locating structural breaks in the intercept
and trend (see, for example, Bai and Perron, 1998, 2003). However, only few are able to consider breaks
in the variance (see, for example, Inclán and Tiao, 1994, McConnell and Pérez-Quirós, 2000, Herrera and
3Reinstatement is diﬀerent from re-hiring because in the former case the employer has to repay the wage for the whole period
of unfair firing.
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Pesavento, 2005, and Wang and Zivot, 2000). To our aim, we have chosen the Bayesian technique developed
by Wang and Zivot (2000) given that their approach allows to detect multiple structural breaks in the level,
trend and variance at the same time, and thus it fits perfectly our needs.4
Wang and Zivot (2000) consider a segmented deterministically trending and heteroskedastic autoregres-
sive model
yt = at + btt+
pX
i=1
φiyt−i + stut, (1)
for t = 1, 2, ..., T , where ut|Ωt ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 1) and Ωt denotes the information set at time t. It is assumed that
the parameters at, bt and st are subject to m < T structural changes, m initially known, with break dates
k1, k2, ..., km, 1 < k1 < k2... < km ≤ T , so that the observations can be separated into m + 1 regimes. Let
k = (k1, k2, ..., km) denote the vector of break dates. For each regime i (i = 1, 2, ...,m+ 1), the parameters
at, bt and st are given by
at = αi, bt = βi, st = σi ≥ 0
for ki−1 ≤ t < ki with k0 = 1 and km+1 = T + 1.
Let IA denote an indicator variable such that IA is equal to one if the event A is true and zero otherwise.
Then (1) can be re-written as
yt =
m+1X
i=1
I{ki−1≤t<ki}(αi + βit) +
pX
i=1
φiyt−i + stut,
or, alternatively, as
yt = x0tB + stut, (2)
where
xt =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
I{k0≤t<k1}
...
I{km≤t<km+1}
t·I{k0≤t<k1}
...
t·I{km≤t<km+1}
yt−1
...
yt−p
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
and B = (α1, ..., αm+1, β1, ..., βm+1, φ1, ..., φp)
0. Let σ = (σ1, σ2, ..., σm+1)0 and define θ = (B0, σ0, k0)0 as the
vector of unknown parameters of (2), Y0 as the vector of p initial values of yt, and Y = (y1, ..., yT )0 as the
vector of observed data. Given the normality of the errors ut, the likelihood function of (2) takes the form
L(θ|Y,Y0) ∝ (
TY
t=1
st)
−1 exp{−1
2
TX
t=1
(yt − x0tB)2
s2t
} (3)
= |S|−1 exp{−(Y −XB)
0S−2(Y −XB)
2
}, (4)
where S is a diagonal matrix with (s1, ..., sT ) on the diagonal and X is a T × (2m+ 2+ p) matrix with t-th
row given by x0t. The estimation is obtained by using the Gibbs sampler.
4 Empirical Results
The above-mentioned methodology for detecting structural breaks has been applied to the following seasonally-
adjusted quarterly time series: employment index (OECD); civilian employment (absolute value) (ISTAT);
4The possibility of several breaks in the time series leads us to reject the McConnell and Pérez-Quirós (2000) methodology,
which was developed to detect the existence of only one break in volatility. Furthermore, the possible existence of breaks
in mean/trend and variance at the same time leads us to reject the Inclán and Tiao (1994) or Herrera and Pesavento (2005)
methodologies. The Bayesian technique developed by Wang and Zivot (2000), instead, has been developed for detecting multiple
structural breaks in the level, trend and variance at the same time.
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employment in services (OECD); employment in industry (Datastream); standard units of dependent labour
(ISTAT);5 real GDP (IFS); industrial production index (IFS). The common available sample runs from
1980:1 to 2007:2.
To determine the number and the type of structural changes, we estimate structural break models with
one autoregressive term allowing for breaks in the intercept, trend and variance with m = 1, ..., 4 breaks.
Model choice based on minimizing BIC favors them = 1 over any other model in all cases but the employment
in Industry, where two breaks are found. Figure 1 presents the plot of all the series and their corresponding
posterior probability of the change point. Table 1 reports the estimates of the parameters for the chosen
models and the date with the highest posterior probability. Our indicator for the overall economic variance
(the real GDP) shows a structural change in 1990:2, corresponding to an increased variance.6 We find
structural changes in 1992 for the employment index, the civilian employment, employment in Services and
the Standard Labour Units.
Years 1991-93 coincide with the start of the second, and most important, wave of labour market deregu-
lation (see section 2).7
Moreover, employment in Industry shows a structural change in 1985 and another in 1991, with increased
variance in each sub-period, even though the variance of the industrial production is constant since 1983. This
result is particularly significant: in this series we detect the predicted eﬀect for both waves of institutional
reforms even though the variance of the industrial production is unchanged.
Summing up, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that institutional reforms have aﬀected
the labour market behaviour by conveying the increased economic fluctuations to the employment.8 This
conclusion is even stronger for the industrial employment, whose variance increases regardless of a constant
variance of the production.
5 Concluding remarks
After 1990 the Italian real GDP has become more volatile with respect to the 1980s, and most of our
employment indicators do so after 1992. The two-year lag necessary to observe some eﬀects of the augmented
economic volatility on the employment coincide with a turning point in labour market legislation. The
dismantling of the wage indexation, the introduction of the so-called Giugni agreement and the start of a
deep deregulation for newly hired workers were supposed to aﬀect the transmission of macroeconomic shocks
to the employment. Thus, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the employment indicators
mirrored the increased macroeconomic variance.
This outcome is even stronger when we isolate the industrial sector, where it is possible to detect an eﬀect
of both deregulation waves even though the variance of the production is unchanged. This means that after
the reforms we find an increase of the employment variance without any increase of the economic variance.
Our conclusions help to explain why it is diﬃcult to find any change in the average job tenure or in job
stability over the last decade: institutional diﬀerences only emerge when we go back to the 1980s. From
the point of view of this paper, the 1990s are a decade with homogeneous institutions, thus we should not
expect striking diﬀerences in the labour market behaviour. Our findings give some support to the widespread
perception of increased job insecurity reported in the press.
5More precisely, we have two series: the standard labour units and the standard units of dependent labour. Unlike the other
employment measures, the standard labour units are based on the working time of a full-time worker, rather than on employees.
Therefore, they also include working time adjustments. The estimates are the same for the two series, thus we present only
one.
6Two breaks (1980:4 and 1990:4) are found when the sample starts in 1970:1. The estimated variances are 0.615183 for
1970:1-1980:4, 0.318946 for 1981:1-1991:4, and 0.477441 for 1991:1-2007:2. This result is consistent with the recent literature
on the reduction of aggregate volatility in most OECD countries after 1980. However, the real GDP variance increases again
in the last period, even though it does not reach its pre-1980 level.
7 In 1992 we observe also the SME crisis and the subsequent recession. However, it is not possible that we are detecting a
simple break in the trend due to the recession: in such a case we should observe another break as the economy recovers.
8Leombruni and Quaranta (2005) compute the gross worker turnover (GWT) over the period 1987-99. They construct a
GWT measure net of the eﬀect of population ageing, and they find a structural increase in the Italian labour market mobility
from 1993 onwards. This finding supports to our results.
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Table 1: Parameter estimates and breaks
Civilian employment Employment index
(1992 : 3) (1992 : 3)
Parameters Mean S tan dardError Mean S tan dard Error
α1 3.351133 0.406615 16.064341 2.028747
α2 2.558531 0.349217 12.253724 1.718155
β1 0.004888 0.001095 0.023405 0.005473
β2 0.012162 0.001117 0.058439 0.005781
φ 0.833315 0.020075 0.833218 0.020981
σ1 0.084588 0.006541 0.409285 0.031961
σ2 0.091586 0.006748 0.434084 0.033591
SUDL Real GDP
(1992 : 3) (1990 : 2)
Parameters Mean S tan dard Error Mean S tan dard Error
α1 0.168271 0.051993 6.008615 1.922348
α2 0.134982 0.044857 6.681354 2.045440
β1 0.000367 0.000120 0.059738 0.013439
β2 0.000645 0.000151 0.032611 0.010308
φ 0.887812 0.034334 0.907912 0.028929
σ1 0.007544 0.000556 0.320505 0.037463
σ2 0.007734 0.000572 0.482163 0.037395
Employment in Services Employment in Industry
(1992 : 3) (1985 : 1 and 1991 : 2)
Parameters Mean S tan dard Error Mean S tan dard Error
α1 2.569123 0.590480 1.044905 0.682523
α2 1.951581 0.470673 0.875671 0.596944
α3 − − 0.865055 0.597791
β1 0.016726 0.003764 −0.00867 0.017232
β2 0.018108 0.004004 0.001673 0.001322
β3 − − −0.00035 0.000593
φ 0.741222 0.060535 0.834676 0.108721
σ1 0.077646 0.007296 0.026359 0.008524
σ2 0.116745 0.009945 0.029210 0.005147
σ3 − − 0.031067 0.002839
Industrial Production
(1983 : 2)
Parameters Mean S tan dard Error
α1 0.285615 0.302812
α2 0.304825 0.315829
β1 −0.00023 0.009427
β2 0.000076 0.000224
φ 0.931770 0.071560
σ1 0.012938 0.004965
σ2 0.013600 0.001107
Note: This Table presents the numerical moments of the parameters referred to the autoregressive term,
intercept, trend and variance, and the date with the highest posterior probability (in parenthesis).
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        Figure 1: Time Series and Posterior Probablility Mass of the Change Point
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